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There is today increasing dissatisfaction with the dis-
jointed economic theory taught at virtually all colleges 
and universities. The theory is split between micro-
economics and macroeconomics, or, in somewhat old-
fashioned terminology, between relative and absolute 
price theory. Dissatisfaction with this split is not new; 
economists have long wanted to integrate relative and 
absolute price theory, but simply did not know how to 
do it. What has intensified dissatisfaction lately are 
theoretical developments that have begun to accom-
plish the integration. These developments extend micro-
economic theory so that it can explain some macro-
economic phenomena and analyze some macroeco-
nomic policies. This paper presents a simple version 
of one such theoretical development and applies it to 
the study of credit controls. 
We study credit controls here primarily because 
their analysis illustrates so dramatically the advan-
tages of using a model that integrates relative and ab-
solute price theory. It does this because the uninte-
grated models or tools of analysis provided by the 
standard economics curriculum are so obviously defi-
cient for the analysis of credit controls. To see this, 
consider how a student who has mastered the standard 
curriculum would go about analyzing the consequences 
of credit controls. 
The student could try to apply the models taught in 
price theory or microeconomics courses. Such models 
treat credit controls as inhibiting trade between poten-
tial borrowers and lenders, or, equivalently, as inhib-
iting trade between present goods and future goods. 
They describe the consequences of such controls as 
being completely analogous to the consequences of 
restrictions on trade between any two goods. The 
models describe how borrowers and lenders are affect-
ed by controls and show that credit controls are not 
Pareto optimal; that is, there exist other arrangements 
that make everyone better off than they are under 
credit controls. 
Such analyses seem, however, seriously incom-
plete. After all, the popular view of credit controls as 
an anti-inflation device is not even addressed; it can-
not be since the price level does not appear in micro-
economic models. In order to consider the price level 
effects of credit controls, the student must turn to the 
models taught in macroeconomics and money and 
banking courses. By manipulating them, the student 
could, perhaps, see why some view credit controls as 
a way to reduce inflation. 
But having done all that, the student should not be 
satisfied and, indeed, ought to be confused. The mi-
croeconomic theory suggests that credit controls are a 
gratuitous interference in the operation of markets, an 
interference that could even make everyone worse off. 
The macroeconomic theory says that the controls 
could help combat inflation. Suppose they do. Does 
that mean that everyone benefits from imposing them? 
Even those borrowers and lenders micro theory says 
are hurt? Are some people both helped and hurt by 
credit controls? 
Clearly, in order to coherently analyze the conse-
quences of policies like credit controls, the student 
needs a model that incorporates features of both micro 
and macro or relative and absolute price theory. This 
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paper describes one such model, a microeconomic 
model that, however, is rich enough to let us also 
study the price level.
1 Within that model, we analyze 
credit controls against the background of different 
monetary and fiscal policies: first when there literally 
is no monetary and fiscal policy —indeed, no govern-
ment currency and, hence, no price level; then against 
the background of a balanced budget and a fixed and 
unchanging stock of government-issued fiat currency; 
and finally when there is a government deficit. 
When we are done, we will have analyzed credit con-
trols in a model with government currency and a govern-
ment deficit, a model which shows qualitatively how 
these controls affect people in different circumstances: 
holders of government currency, borrowers, and lend-
ers. We may even have come to some understanding 
of why credit controls have been adopted as often as 
they have been.
2 
Overlapping Generations and Competitive 
Loan Demand and Supply 
The crucial features of a model built to analyze the 
effects of credit controls are its demand and supply 
functions for assets. The important axioms that under-
lie these functions in the model presented below are 
that 
1. Assets are valued only in terms of their payoffs. 
2. Anticipated payoffs are the same as actual 
payoffs. 
3. Barring legal restrictions (like credit controls), 
no transaction costs inhibit borrowing and 
lending.
3 
Of these axioms, the first is, perhaps, the most im-
portant. It says that the demand for assets is a derived 
demand. Assets are not wanted per se, but only be-
cause of what they allow individuals to accomplish. 
Simply put, they are wanted because they let people 
convert income received in one time period into 
spending in a different time period. Policies like credit 
controls affect individuals by altering the terms on 
which they can accomplish such conversions. It is by 
strictly adhering to the first axiom that we are able to 
trace back to individuals all the effects of credit 
controls. 
The second axiom is a perfect foresight, or rational 
expectations, axiom. In a model with assets, what hap-
pens today depends on what people think will happen 
to asset prices in the future. The second axiom is a 
defensible way of pinning down such views. Jt says, in 
effect, that expectations about the future are always 
realized. 
The third axiom, the absence of transaction costs, 
implies that default-free private loans are perfect sub-
stitutes for default-free government liabilities, including 
currency, except insofar as legal restrictions inhibit 
the substitution of one for the other. Since credit con-
trols are the only legal restriction considered in this 
analysis, default-free private loans and currency are 
treated as perfect substitutes except when certain kinds 
of credit controls are in effect. One interpretation of 
this treatment is that without legal restrictions, inter-
mediaries costlessly convert default-free private loans 
into intermediary liabilities — bank notes or similar 
payment instruments — that the public considers per-
fect substitutes for government-issued currency. 
Although critical, these three axioms are not, by 
themselves, a complete model. Our first task, there-
fore, is to describe a complete model, one consistent 
with these axioms and rich enough to allow us to ad-
dress the effects of credit controls. The following vari-
ant of a model introduced by Samuelson satisfies 
these requirements.
4 
The economy is peopled by overlapping gener-
ations which live two periods each. At each date t 
(where t is an integer) a new generation — generation 
t—appears. Members of generation t are in this econ-
omy at t and f+1 only. Thus, at any date t, the popu-
lation consists of the members of generation t~ 1 (who 
are old at t) and the members of generation t (who are 
young at t). 
At each date, only one good exists. The good that 
exists at date t is called the time t good. Each member 
iThe analysis may be fairly demanding for some readers. It requires 
familiarity with the material presented in an intermediate level (relative) price 
theory course. 
2Credit controls have been in effect temporarily several times in the United 
States, but are more prevalent abroad. They seem, for example, to be almost 
permanent fixtures in the post-World War II economies of the United 
Kingdom, France, and Japan. 
3For a defense of these axioms — particularly the third, which is the most 
controversial — and for the application of a model consistent with them to the 
study of monetary policy, see John Bryant and Neil Wallace, A suggestion for 
further simplifying the theory of money, Research Department Staff Report 
62, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Minnesota (1980). 
4See Paul A. Samuelson, An exact consumption-loan model of interest 
with or without the social contrivance of money, Journal of Political Economy 
66 (December 1958): 467-82. 
17 of generation t has preferences over lifetime consump-
tion bundles consisting of some amount of the time t 
good and some amount of the time t+1 good. We 
represent such preferences by an indifference curve 
map of the kind shown in Figure 1. Any combination 
of time t and time 1 goods is on some indifference 
curve (even though we have shown only some of the 
curves). The individual member of generation t is in-
different among bundles on the same indifference curve 
and prefers bundles on higher indifference curves (in 
the direction of the arrow) to bundles on lower indif-
ference curves. 
Each member of generation t also has an endow-
ment of the time t good and the time t+1 good, de-
noted w/(t) and w/(/+1), respectively, for member j of 
generation t. We assume that these goods cannot be 
produced by anything else, and, in particular, that the 
time t good cannot be used to produce the time t+1 
good, say, by way of storage. In other words, unless 
member j engages in some sort of trade, she or he is 
stuck with the endowment as a lifetime consumption 
bundle. 
In order to generate borrowing and lending, we 
impose some diversity within generation t. But to keep 
things simple, we do this in a very particular way. 
Every member of generation t has the same prefer-
ences, the same indifference curve map, but different 
members have different endowments: some members, 
who we call lenders, have a common endowment 
heavily weighted toward the time t good, while the 
rest, who we call borrowers, have an endowment 
heavily weighted toward the time t+1 good (see Fig-
ure 1). These different endowments provide a basis for 
intertemporal trade (borrowing and lending) between 
members of the two groups. 
Also, for simplicity, we assume that this within-
generation diversity is the only diversity. Thus, we 
assume that the composition of different generations 
regarding preferences and endowments is unchanging. 
That is, the preferences and endowments of the mem-
bers of any single generation are identical to those of 
any other generation. 
Now we must describe competitive desired trades 
of the time t good and the time t+1 good by lenders 
and borrowers at various terms of trade. We denote 
these terms of trade by the symbol R(t), where R(t) is 
the price of the time t good in units of the time t+1 
good. Equivalently, R(t) is the discount factor for 
Figure 1 
The Preferences and Endowments 
of Borrowers and Lenders in Generation t 
good 
computing the time t present value of the time t+1 
good; thus, time t wealth of member j of generation t 
in units of the time t good is w>/(0 + [w>/(r+l )]/R(f). 
[The reader should think of R(t) as the gross real rate 
of interest, gross because it is unity plus the real rate 
of interest.] We describe the trades lenders desire as a 
market supply curve of the time t good, or, equivalent-
ly, as a curve which describes the desired saving or 
lending of the group heavily endowed with the time t 
good. We denote this supply curve by or S(R) 
or S. We describe the trades borrowers desire as a 
market demand curve for the time t good, or, equiv-
alently, as a curve which describes the desired dissav-
ing or borrowing of the group heavily endowed with 
the time t+1 good. We denote this demand curve by 
D[i?(0] or D(R) or D. 
To find the S curve, we first find the desired supply 
of the time t good for one lender, then sum the desired 
trades over all the generation t lenders. Figure 2 shows 
one lender's supply of the time t good at a particular 
value of R(t). The straight line is the upper boundary 
of all affordable bundles, the lender's budget set, im-
plied by that value of R(t). Given that the lender be-
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Figure 2 
A Lender's Supply of the Time t Good 
Given R(t) 
Figure 3 
Market Supply of and Demand for 
the Time t Good 
good 
haves competitively, as a price taker, the supply of the 
time t good by the lender at the particular value of R(t) 
is the difference between the lender's endowment of 
the time t good and the lender's preferred consumption 
of the time t good at that value of R(t). By facing the 
lender with different values of R(t), we trace out how 
the individual lender's supply of the time t good de-
pends on R(t). Since all lenders are assumed identical, 
the S curve is simply the number of lenders in any 
generation, NL, times the supply of the time t good of 
the individual lender. To avoid possible complications 
not central to the points to be made, we assume that 
the S curve slopes upward, as shown in Figure 3. 
The D curve, assumed to slope downward, is ob-
tained in an analogous fashion.
5 
Given the assumption that different generations are 
identical, the S and D curves in Figure 3 describe 
competitive desired saving of lenders and dissaving of 
borrowers in every period. Notice that these curves 
intersect at a value of R(t) less than unity or at a 
negative real rate of interest. This is what allows this 
model to be consistent with valued fiat currency in the 
absence of legal restrictions of any kind. One way of 
fulfilling this negative real interest rate condition is to 
have the number of lenders be sufficiently greater than 
the number of borrowers. 
In succeeding sections, we will use the S and D 
curves and variants of them to study how the competi-
tive equilibrium for our model depends on institutional 
arrangements—whether or not there are credit con-
trols and the nature of such controls, whether or not 
there is fiat currency, and whether or not there is a 
government deficit. We think of ourselves as standing 
at the current date (for convenience, labeled t=1) and 
asking how the economy will evolve from this date on 
into the indefinite future under various institutional 
arrangements or policies we could adopt, assuming 
that that evolution takes the form of a competitive 
equilibrium. 
5Formally, if u[c/(t), c/(/+l)] is the utility function where c/(t+i) is 
consumption of time t+i good by member j of generation t, then 
S[R(t)]=NLs[R(t)], where s[R(t)] is the solution for w/(t)-c/(t) to the prob-
lem of maximizing u subject to c/(t)+[c/(t+1)]//?(/) <wf(t) +[w/'(f+1 )]//?(f), 
with j being a lender. On the demand side, where NB is 
the number of borrowers in a generation and d[R{t)] is the solution for 
c/(t)~w/(t) to the same problem, but with j being a borrower. 
That D(R) slopes downward follows from assuming that the time t and 
time /+1 goods are not inferior goods. That S(R) slopes upward requires that 
the substitution effect dominate the income effect. 
19 Notice that at t = \ the population of this economy 
consists of the members of generation 0 (the old) and 
the members of generation 1 (the young). While the 
preferences and endowments we have described and 
their implied S and D curves apply to young people at 
time 1, they do not apply to those people who are old 
then. We assume that each old person at time 1 be-
haves competitively and attempts to maximize her or 
his consumption of the time 1 good. While this implies 
rather passive and simple behavior by the old at t=\, 
we do not want to ignore these people. Indeed, most of 
our analysis will involve a discussion of how three dif-
ferent groups fare: the old at t=l, lenders in the first 
and successive generations, and borrowers in the first 
and successive generations. 
Credit Controls in an Economy 
Without Currency 
We start with a purely relative price analysis of credit 
controls. We analyze the equilibrium for the model 
described above in the absence of fiat currency — first 
when there are no credit controls and then under cost-
lessly enforced quantitative limits on how much each 
person may borrow.
6 
The only trade that goes on at date t is intertem-
poral trade among members of generation t. To see 
why, consider the situation of the members of gener-
ation t— 1, the old at t. By assumption, each wants to 
get as much of the time t good as she or he can. But in 
order for the old to trade for more than what they start 
with, they must give up something to the young at f, 
and the old have nothing to give up. The young would 
conceivably take a claim on the time t+1 good, but by 
assumption, the old have no such claim. (In the next 
section, they will have a potential claim in the form of 
fiat currency.) Here, therefore, to determine the equi-
librium quantity of loans and the terms of trade, or the 
real interest rate, at any date t, we need only equate 
saving by generation t lenders to dissaving by gener-
ation t borrowers. 
In the absence of controls, the relevant demand and 
supply curves are the D and S curves derived above 
(see Figure 3). The equilibrium is the intersection of 
those curves. Let's compare this solution with that 
under credit controls. 
Consider a limit on the amount of the time t good 
each member of generation t may borrow. To get the 
demand for borrowing under this constraint, we must 
determine for each borrower a budget set that takes 
this constraint into account. Again we face each bor-
rower with arbitrary terms of trade and ask what she 
or he would like to do, but now the implied budget set 
is as shown in Figure 4. 
It follows quite generally that for all values of R(t) 
less than or equal to some critical value, total desired 
borrowing (or dissaving) is at the limit. The critical 
value, denoted R in Figure 5, is the value of R(t) at 
which borrowing is equal to the limit when there are 
no controls. Figure 5 shows the relationship between 
aggregate desired dissaving by borrowers with and 
without a constraint. 
A limitation on each borrower does not change the 
amount of the time t good lenders want to supply (in 
the region where that supply is positive). So the equi-
librium under this sort of credit control is found by 
equating the unconstrained supply of the time t good 
by lenders to the constrained demand for the time t 
good by borrowers. Figure 6 shows the situation 
under a particular constraint. 
The effects of a limit on borrowing are fairly 
straightforward. A binding limitation on borrowing 
hurts lenders and, depending on how stringent it is, 
may hurt or help borrowers. A sufficiently mild limita-
tion, one that restricts borrowing to be only slightly 
less than what it would be without the constraint, 
helps borrowers because it imposes a solution that is 
in the direction of what would occur if borrowers 
acted jointly as a monopoly. However, a sufficiently 
stringent limitation, one that restricts individual bor-
rowing to almost nothing, obviously hurts borrowers. 
Finally, binding credit controls of the sort we have 
examined are not Pareto optimal; given an equilibrium 
with binding credit controls, there exists an alternative 
assignment of the total endowment of the economy at 
each date that makes at least someone better off and 
no one worse off than in the credit control equilibrium.
7 
This completes our purely relative price theory 
analysis of credit controls. Notice that we have not 
used the dynamic, overlapping generations structure 
of our framework. The market analysis we have pre-
sented treats generation t in isolation, as a separate 
two-good pure exchange economy in which the two 
6For an analysis of the effects of a limit on lending, see Appendix A. 
7Readers familiar with Edgeworth box diagrams should be able to prove 
this. Simply construct such a diagram using a borrower and a lender in 
generation t as the two individuals with the dimensions of the box determined 
by the equilibrium consumption bundles under binding credit controls. 
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Figure 4 
A Borrower's Demand for the Time t Good 
Given R(t) and a Limit on Borrowing 
good 
maximum 
allowable J 
borrowing ^ 
(or dissaving) 
wj(t) 
borrower's 
\ budget set 
\ y [all affordable bundles 
\/ given R{t) and a limit 
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Figure 5 
How a Limit on Borrowing Changes 
Market Demand for the Time t Good 
R(t)• 
unconstrained 
demand D(R) 
time t 
good 
Figure 6 
Market Equilibrium 
With and Without a Limit on Borrowing 
goods, which we labeled time t good and time t+1 
good, could have been labeled x and y or apple and 
orange. 
Because this analysis has not addressed the abso-
lute price level effects of credit controls, it may not be 
the whole story. Certainly, someone who advocated 
credit controls because of presumed beneficial effects 
on the path of the price level would not be willing to 
use it to appraise credit controls. Not that the analysis 
denies beneficial price level effects; it simply does not 
address them. We take a first step toward overcoming 
this omission in the next section. 
Credit Controls in an Economy 
With Currency and No Deficit 
The economy of this section is identical to that of the 
last, except that now the old at the initial date, t=1, 
own among them M units of fiat or unbacked currency. 
Aside from having provided this stock of currency 
sometime in the past (or at t= 1), the government is 
assumed to do nothing but impose or not impose cred-
it controls. In particular, this government has a per-
21 manently balanced budget. 
The fiat currency owned by the old at t = 1 is 
potentially a claim on goods at t=2, 3, ... . This 
claim satisfies the old dictum about money that a per-
son gives up goods for it only because that person 
expects to be able to subsequently exchange it for 
goods. In our model, this dictum takes the following 
form. 
If fiat currency is to have value at every date (is to 
be worth something in terms of goods), then a young 
person in generation t, most likely a lender, must be 
willing to give up some of the time t good in order to 
acquire some of the fiat currency. If the lender is will-
ing to do that, it is because the lender expects to be 
able to exchange the fiat currency for goods at time 
t-1-1 by selling it to a member of generation t+1, again, 
most likely a lender of generation t+1. Yet that is not 
enough. If the lender is free to grant as many loans 
and buy as much currency as she or he wishes, then in 
order that both currency have value and loans be 
granted, some lenders must expect the rate of return 
on currency to be at least as high as that on loans, 
while others must expect the rate of return on loans to 
be at least as high as that on currency. 
Obviously, the second of our initial axioms be-
comes important here. According to it, realizations 
never differ from previously held beliefs; thus, expec-
tations about future values of currency turn out to be 
exactly right when the economy is in equilibrium. We 
will call an equilibrium of this sort a perfect foresight 
equilibrium. 
The imposition of perfect foresight simplifies matters 
in several ways. It implies that lenders at time t are 
unanimous, which, in turn, implies that if lenders are 
free to hold whatever portfolio they want and if cur-
rency and loans are both held in equilibrium, then the 
rate of return on currency will be the same as the rate 
of return on loans. Perfect foresight also suggests a 
shortcut to thinking about at least one equilibrium in 
which currency is worth something in every period. If 
that is to be true, then at each date all the old must 
offer all the existing currency for sale, it having been 
passed on to them from generation to generation. In 
other words, the quantity of currency supplied at each 
date is the same (namely, M units), and it is offered at 
any positive price in terms of goods. The demand for 
currency at each date t arises from the behavior of the 
members of generation t. Since they are exactly the 
same at every date, it makes sense to suppose that the 
demand for currency is too. And if the demand and 
supply schedules or functions are both the same at 
every date, then it makes sense to look for an equilib-
rium in which the price of currency, the value of each 
piece in terms of goods, is the same at every date. 
(Note that this is equivalent to saying that the abso-
lute price level of goods in terms of currency — which 
is the inverse of the price of currency — is constant.) 
For the economy we have described, in the absence 
of credit controls, there is, indeed, an equilibrium in 
which the price of currency is positive and constant. 
To demonstrate that, we must show that there is some 
price of currency p>0 such that when individuals face 
this price and the implied gross return of unity on 
currency in every period, then in every period the 
supply of currency equals the demand for currency 
and desired borrowing equals desired lending. 
Figure 7 
Market Equilibrium in an Economy With Currency 
and No Deficit or Controls 
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We proceed graphically, using Figure 7 (which is 
simply Figure 3 with some additional labeling). In 
Figure 7, the quantity B represents desired saving (or 
lending) of lenders atR(t) = \, while A represents de-
sired dissaving (or borrowing) of borrowers at 7?(r) = l. 
Thus, B— A represents the excess of desired saving 
over desired dissaving at i?(f) = l. Our proposed un-
changing equilibrium price of currency, p, is the one 
that makes the value of currency fill the gap between 
lenders' desired saving and borrowers' desired dis-
saving at /?(1) = 1; namely, p = (B—A)/M. We now 
argue that this constant price of currency and R(t) = l 
for all r>l are part of a perfect foresight competitive 
equilibrium. 
If /?(£) = 1 and the gross rate of return on currency 
is unity, then lenders want to save B in every period. 
Moreover, since the return on loans is the same as 
that on currency, they do not care how much of each 
they have in their portfolios; any quantities of loans 
and currency whose value sums to B is alright. In 
particular, if the amount of loans held is A, which is 
the amount borrowers want to borrow at i?(r) = l, then 
B—A is the value of currency lenders want to hold. 
Thus, we have equality between currency supply and 
currency demand and between loan supply and loan 
demand at p=(B~A)/M and R(t) = \ [and an abso-
lute price level ofM/(B— A)]. 
At any date t, in an equilibrium in this economy, 
generation t lenders grant loans to generation t bor-
rowers and buy currency from members of generation 
t— 1, the old at t. In terms of goods, in the aggregate 
they spend B—A on currency and grant loans in the 
amount^ at R(t) = l. Lenders expect the gross return 
on currency to be unity and are not disappointed. 
Several features of our economy are crucial for the 
existence of this type of equilibrium. The amount of 
currency in the system must be M units in every 
period (an assumption that will be dropped in the next 
section). The S and D curves must be in the same 
position in every period, which follows from our as-
sumption that generations are identical. And at 
/?(/)=1, desired saving of lenders must exceed desired 
dissaving of borrowers. 
Now consider what happens in this economy when 
the amount of borrowing by each borrower is perma-
nently limited. Just as in the simpler economy without 
currency, lenders' aggregate desired supply is not af-
fected by the control, and borrowers' aggregate demand 
Figure 8 
The Effect of a Limit on Borrowing 
on Market Equilibrium in an Economy 
With Currency and No Deficit 
With controls: A'=loans B-A'=currency 
Without controls: A= loans B-A=currency 
obviously is; it is derived exactly as before. Suppose it 
is as illustrated in Figure 8. Then there exists an equi-
librium with
 = l for all t>\ and with a constant 
and positive price of currency given by p=(B—A')/M 
[and a constant and positive absolute price level of 
M/(B-A')]. 
A comparison with the no-control equilibrium in 
Figure 7 is straightforward. Lenders are affected by 
the control, but only in the composition of their sav-
ing; because of the control, less is in loans and more is 
in currency. Borrowers still face a gross borrowing 
rate of unity, but they are constrained to borrow less 
than they would like to at that rate. Finally, the initial 
old at t=\ get more goods for their currency than in 
the absence of this kind of credit control. 
There is quite a contrast between these conse-
quences of a limit on borrowing and those in the last 
section. In the standard micro economy without cur-
23 rency, remember, such a limitation could hurt every-
one involved in borrowing or lending: borrowers might 
be helped or hurt, while lenders were always hurt. The 
initial old were not involved or affected. Here, with a 
fixed supply of government currency, however, the 
same limitation does not affect lenders, necessarily 
hurts borrowers, and necessarily benefits the initial 
old. Thus, although an equilibrium with binding credit 
controls is again not Pareto optimal, the fact that 
some individuals definitely prefer controls to no 
controls helps explain why there is support for such 
controls. As we now show, in an economy with a 
permanent government deficit, even more individuals 
prefer controls to no controls. 
Credit Controls in an Economy 
With a Permanent Deficit 
Here we assume that the government attempts to fi-
nance a permanent real deficit by currency creation.
8 
Again we compare what happens to members of the 
economy with and without credit controls. 
For the government to get command over G(t)>0 
units of the time t good by issuing additional currency 
at time t, it is necessary that 
(1) G(t)=p(t)[M(t)-M(t-1)] 
where p(t) is the price of currency in terms of goods at 
t (again, the inverse of the price level at t) and M(t) is 
the stock of currency held from t to t+1 by members 
of generation t.
9 
For t> 1 andp(t)>0 for all f, we may rewrite (1) 
as 
(2) G(t)=p(t)M(t) -p(t~ 1 )M{t-1 )\p(t)/p(t-1)]. 
Let m[R(t)] be the demand for real money holdings at 
time t. (As we saw above, in the absence of controls, 
For equilibrium we re-
quire that m[R(t)]=p(t)M{t) for all t> 1 and that 
R(t—\)=p(t)/p(t—l) if currency is held. Substituting 
these equilibrium requirements into (2) we get 
(3) 
We will assume that G(t)=G> 0, a constant for all 
and will look for an equilibrium with the property 
that R(t)=R, a constant for all t. By (3), such a value 
of R must satisfy 
(4) G=(l-/?)«(/?) 
where 1— R should be thought of as a tax rate and 
(1 —R)m(R) as a revenue curve or function. If we can 
find an R that satisfies (4), then we find the corre-
sponding price of money at t= 1 from the t= 1 version 
of (1), namely, 
(5) G=p(\)M(\)—p(\ )M(0)=m(R) -p( 1 )M( 0). 
With R known from (4) and M(0) given as an initial 
condition, (5) can be solved for p( 1). It also follows 
that M{t)/M(t-\)=\/R, the gross inflation rate for 
all t>\. 
We first consider the situation without credit con-
trols. In this case, as mentioned above, the function 
m(R) is the horizontal distance between the S and D 
curves of Figure 3; m(R)=S(R)—D(R) for values of 
R where S(R)~D(R)>0. Figure 9 shows a hypo-
thetical (1 -R)[S(R)-D(R)] function. 
Notice that R is the equilibrium return on loans of 
our simplest economy, without government currency 
or controls. Notice also that if G can in fact be sup-
ported by currency issue in the absence of controls — 
that is, if G<G* — then, in general, at least two values 
of R (and tax rates 1 —R) are solutions. We will limit 
our attention to the solution for which R is a maxi-
mum, the minimum tax-rate^ solution. In the situation 
depicted in Figure 9, this is R. 
The reader should be able to verify thatp(t+1 )/p(t) 
=M(t~\)/M(t)=R for all t> 1 andp( 1) given by (5) 
with R=R and m(R)=S(R)-D(R) is a perfect fore-
sight competitive equilibrium in which the government 
gets command over G units of the time t good at every 
date t> 1 (and the gross inflation rate is l/R). 
In order to study financing of the same deficit under 
credit controls, we must replace m(R)=S(R)—D(R) 
by m(R) as given by the difference between possibly 
constrained supply and demand curves. Suppose 
again that the amount of borrowing by each borrower 
8A temporary deficit and temporary credit controls are studied in Ap-
pendix B. 
9We regard G(t) as resources used to provide a public good — for example, 
national defense — and assume that the amount provided does not affect the 
way individuals rank alternative private lifetime consumption bundles. That is, 
the indifference curve map of Figure 1 does not depend on G(t). 
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time t ^ 
good 
Figure 9 
Government Revenue 
in an Economy Without Controls 
(1 -R)[S(R)-D(R)} 
R 1.0 \ R 
is limited and that this produces the desired dissaving 
curve of the last section (see Figure 8), a curve de-
noted D'(R). Since D'(R)<D(R) at each value of R 
where S(R)~D(R)>0 and R<1, the borrowing limi-
tation produces a higher revenue function. (This is 
illustrated in Figure 10.) 
It follows immediately that under such a limitation 
the deficit G is consistent with a lower gross inflation 
rate (1 /R' instead of l/R) and with a higher initial 
price of money [see equation (5)] than exist without 
controls. This, in turn, implies that lenders and the 
initial old prefer such controls to no controls and that 
the reverse is true for borrowers. Credit controls in an 
economy with currency and a permanent government 
deficit, then, help everyone except borrowers. Thus, 
although it is still true that any outcome with binding 
credit controls is not Pareto optimal, when the alter-
time t^ 
good 
Figure 10 
Government Revenue 
With and Without a Limit on Borrowing 
(1 -R)[S(R)-D'(R)] 
/ 
native to controls is no controls, most people prefer 
controls. 
Concluding Remarks 
It must be admitted that the kind of analysis of credit 
controls presented above represents, at most, a small 
step toward a satisfactory analysis. We have seen that 
every outcome with binding credit controls is not 
Pareto optimal: if we treat as attainable any outcome 
that does not exceed the total resources available, 
then at least one outcome exists that makes everybody 
better off than they are with binding credit controls. It 
seems doubtful, however, that all such outcomes are 
attainable. If they were, not only would we argue that 
credit controls are undesirable, we would predict that 
we would not observe them. We would also, by the 
way, predict that we would never observe use of a 
distorting tax, one that generates attempts to avoid it. 
25 Examples of such taxes are tariffs, excise taxes, in-
come taxes, and the deficit assumed to exist in the last 
section.
1
0
 The obvious, if troublesome, conclusion is 
that we cannot oppose credit controls by appealing to 
their non-Pareto optimality in the set of outcomes that 
do not exceed the total resources. Yet to assume that 
the only options are market outcomes with and with-
out controls is to assume that too few outcomes are 
attainable. For example, if quantitative controls on 
loans can be enforced, then it seems likely that a tax 
on loans can too. What seems to be needed, then, is a 
better model of the set of attainable outcomes than the 
one we have provided. 
Despite this, the kind of integrated analysis that we 
have presented is clearly a substantial improvement 
over the analyses of standard economic theory. It 
should leave students considerably less confused. In-
stead of leaving them with the task of integrating the 
conclusions of separate relative and absolute price 
analyses, it provides students with a model that simul-
taneously displays both types of effects which policies 
like credit controls may have. 
lOFor a welfare analysis of a permanent deficit, see Neil Wallace, The 
overlapping generations model of fiat money, in Models of monetary econo-
mies, ed. John H. Kareken and Neil Wallace, Federal Reserve Bank of 
Minneapolis, Minnesota (1980): 49-82. 
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Appendix A 
The Effects of a Limit on Lending 
In an Economy Without Currency 
When there is no fiat currency, the analysis of a limit on the 
amount each lender can lend is analogous to that of a limit on 
borrowing. Lenders' constrained supply of the time t good is 
derived and equated to borrowers' unconstrained demand. 
(Figure A1 depicts the situation under a particular con-
straint.) Again in this simple economy, everyone involved 
can be hurt: borrowers always are and lenders may or may 
not be, depending on how stringent the lending control is. 
In an Economy With Currency and No Deficit 
When fiat currency is in the model but there is no government 
deficit, the analysis of the lending limit is not quite so 
analogous to that of the borrowing limit. A control on lending 
is somewhat more difficult to analyze. Notice that under this 
kind of control the return on loans may be higher than that on 
currency. In such a situation, even though every lender would 
like to switch from currency to loans, the quantitative restric-
tion prevents them from doing so. 
Figure A1 
Market Equilibrium 
With and Without a Limit on Lending 
R(t) 
/ 
/ 
/ \ 
1 
f\ unconstrained 
supply S(R)  D(R) 
time t 
good 
Suppose that each lender is restricted to saving no more 
than L in the form of loans, where NLL<A, A being the 
amount lent in the equilibrium without controls depicted in 
Figure 7. (Recall that NL is the number of lenders.) Since 
borrowers are unconstrained, the gross rate on loans must be 
high enough to make borrowers demand only NLL amount of 
loans. This rate, denotedRL, is found by consulting theD(7?) 
curve of Figure 7; that is, it is the solution to D(RL)=NLL. 
Obviously, withNlL<A,Rl> 1. 
Now consider the budget set facing a lender under this 
kind of constraint, with a rate of return on currency equal to 
unity. Figure A2 shows such a budget set (along with that 
faced by a lender in the no-control equilibrium of Figure 7). 
Several conclusions may be drawn from studying the de-
cision making of lenders faced with this kind of kinked budget 
set. First, lenders are better off under a constraint of this kind 
than they are in the no-control equilibrium. Second, total 
desired saving is less with a constraint than with R(t)=\ and 
Figure A2 
A Lender's Budget Set 
With a Limit on Lending 
in an Economy With Currency and No Deficit 
timer 
good 
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/ budget set 
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A Lender's Budget Set 
With a Limit on Lending 
in an Economy With a Gross Inflation Rate of MR 
no constraint * Third, desired saving in the form of currency 
may be greater or less thanB—A (see Figure 7). 
Thus, the effects of a quantitative limit on the amount of 
lending by each lender are not clear-cut: borrowers are hurt 
and lenders are helped, but how the current old are affected is 
ambiguous. The ambiguity can be removed by making L 
sufficiently small. In the extreme case of no lending allowed, 
the current old are necessarily benefited — but lenders no 
longer are. For sufficiently small amounts of allowed loans, 
though, saving in the form of currency and, hence, the price of 
currency are higher than in the unconstrained equilibrium. So 
when lending is limited to a sufficiently small amount, both 
lenders and the current old benefit. 
In an Economy With a Permanent Deficit 
When there is a permanent government deficit, the analysis 
of a limit on lending is no less ambiguous than without a 
deficit. 
Suppose again that the limit is such that the rate on loans, 
RL, which makes borrowers willing to borrow no more than 
the limit, exceeds unity. In this case, to find the relevant M(R) 
function for equation (4), we only need to slightly generalize 
the approach described earlier. 
•This follows if first-period consumption is not an inferior good. 
Figure A3 shows the budget set facing a lender under a 
particular restriction on loans, L, the implied RL, and some 
rate of return on currency, R. It follows from our other 
assumptions that the preferred point on this budget set is 
somewhere on the line segment CC', possibly at C. If the 
preferred point is E, then the value of the relevant m(R) 
function at the particular value of R depicted in Figure A3 is 
wj(t)—L—Ex. By considering various values of R, we can 
trace out the relevant m(R) function. 
The important conclusion from this analysis is that we 
cannot say for each value of R whether the implied m(R) 
function exceeds or falls short of S(R)—D(R). Thus, unlike 
the situation with a restriction on borrowing, here we cannot 
order in any simple way the revenue functions with and 
without controls. Therefore, we cannot generally conclude 
that a given real government deficit can be financed at a 
lower inflation rate and a lower initial price level with this 
kind of control than with no control. However, if the lending 
limitation is stringent enough, such a conclusion does hold. In 
that case, both lenders and the current old prefer the situation 
with controls to that without controls. 
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Appendix B 
Temporary Credit Controls 
The framework presented in the text can also be used to 
analyze a temporary imposition of credit controls given a 
temporary deficit. In the United States, at least, credit 
controls have usually been imposed as a temporary device, 
presumably to deal with a temporary situation like a tempo-
rary deficit. 
We analyze only the following simple situation. The 
government attempts to raise G units of the time 1 good by a 
new issue of currency at time 1. Thereafter, forever, it runs a 
balanced budget, one consequence of which is M{t)=M{ 1) 
for all t >1. We compare the situation without credit controls 
only with that under a limitation on borrowing by each 
borrower and only at time 1. 
In the absence of credit controls, we look for the same 
kind of equilibrium found earlier in the economy with a 
balanced budget in every period. That is, we look for a 
positive and unchanging price of currency,/?. Here, however, 
we replace the fixed and unchanging quantity of currency, M, 
by M( 1), which is the amount of currency available to be 
purchased by the young at time 1, the sum of what the old at t 
start with, M(0), and what the government issues at t=l. 
The quantities p and M( 1) must satisfy two equations: 
/?M(1)=S(1)-Z)(1) and p[M{\)~M{0)]=G, where S( 1) 
and D( 1) are read off the curves of Figure 3 and M(0) and G 
are given parameters. If G<S( 1 )~D( 1), these equations can 
be solved for p and M( 1). [Note that the second equation is 
equation (1), the government budget constraint, for t= 1, 
while the first is the familiar condition that the supply of 
currency be equal to the demand for currency.] 
We now compare features of that solution to those of the 
solution under a limitation on each borrower at t—1. We 
show that under such a limitation there is an equilibrium with 
a constant price of currency from t=2 on; in particular, an 
equilibrium withp(t)=p(2)>p(\)>0 for all t>2. 
As was true without controls, the quantity of currency is 
constant at M(l) from t= 1 on. The three quantities, ^(1), 
p(2), and M( 1), must satisfy 
(B1) p{ 1 )M( 1 )=S\p(2)/p( 1)] ~D'\p(2)/p( 1)] 
(B2) p{2)M{\)=S{\)~D{\) 
(B3) p( 1 )[M( 1) —M(0)]=G. 
Here, (Bl) expresses equality between the time 1 supply of 
currency and the time 1 demand for currency. The demand is 
given by the difference between the unconstrained lenders' 
supply at the rate of return implied by the time 1 and time 2 
prices of currency and the constrained borrowers' demand, 
D\ at this same rate of return. Equation (B2) expresses 
equality between the supply of and the demand for currency 
at t>2, while (B3) is the t=\ government budget constraint. 
To show that these equations have a solution, we divide 
(Bl)by (B2) to get 
(B4) \/R(l)={S[R(l)]-D'[R(l)] }/{S(l)~D(\)] 
where R(l)=p(2)/p(l). Given our_ assumptions, equation 
(B4) has a unique solution denoted ^(1). [That any /?(1)>1 
is not a solution follows from Z>'( 1 )<Z>(1) and from the fact 
that S(R)—D'(R) is increasing in R.] Equation (B4) implies 
that S[R(l)]-D'[R(l)]>S(\)-D(l), which by equation 
(B3) implies that the initial price level is lower under this 
constraint on borrowers at t— 1 than when there is no 
constraint. 
The individuals affected by whether or not such a tempo-
rary credit control is imposed at t= 1 are those present in the 
economy at t=l. The control helps the old at £=1 but hurts 
the lenders of generation 1. It may either help or hurt the 
borrowers of generation 1. 
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